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ROOTS  OF  U.  S.  FOREIGN  POLICY
In  dealing  with  foreign  affairs  those  who  speak  for  the  United
States  have  characteristically  articulated  its  policies  on  the  basis
of  a  set  of  propositions  rooted  in  the  eighteenth  century,  a  time
known  to  us as  the  Age of Reason.  These basic  propositions,  colored
with eighteenth  century rationalism,  are conveyed  to us  in the Decla-
ration of  Independence.  Our  magistrates  often  cite  the  Declaration,
explicitly or indirectly.  They tend to cite it because  these propositions
appeal  to  the  American  conscience.  They  provide  the  touchstones
of justification  in  our conduct  in world  affairs.
The  Declaration  as  a  document  relevant  to  foreign  policy  is
significant  in  four  respects.  First,  the  Declaration  embodies  a  de-
mand  of  the  right  to  stand  among  the  powers  of  the  earth.  Therein
the  Americans  insist  on entering  the  nexus  of  diplomacy.  They  will
no  longer,  if  they  can  help  it,  permit  their  relations  with  the  world
at large to be  channeled  through  and  managed  by the British  regime
ensconced  in  London.  Second,  the  Declaration  is  a  bid  for  support
of  this  cause  among  various  countries  of  Europe.  In  particular,  it
seeks  intellectual  support.  It  seeks  to stir  up  the thinkers  and  writers
of  the time  and  to  get  them  to back  the American  cause.  Third,  to
put  the  matter  in  contemporary  terms,  it  is  an  exercise  in  psycho-
logical  warfare  directed  against  the  British  themselves.  It  seeks,  as
best it can,  to arouse sympathies  for the American  cause  and thereby
weaken  the adversary  will  in  Britain.  Fourth,  as  a  matter  related  to
the  preceding  three,  the  Declaration  asserts  a set  of norms  about  the
world  in  general  and  the  relationships  among  peoples  in  the  world.
I want  to examine  these  asserted  norms  for  a  moment.  They  are  by
no means  as conclusive  as the Declaration  asserts and as we take them
to be.
A rational  world  is  postulated.  Truths are held to be  self-evident.
Now  that  is  an  amazing  proposition!  No  empirical  evidence  for  the
idea  is  adduced.  The proponents  of  the idea  just flatly  assert  it  as  if
nobody  would  question  it.  Second,  the document  conceives  of  man-
kind  as  basically  unified.  I  do  not  mean  that  in  a  political  sense.
I  mean  it  in  the  sense  of  having  common  assumptions  and  showing
common  responses.  I  refer,  of  course,  to  the  language  concerning
"decent  respect  to the  opinions  of  mankind."  Third,  equality  among
35all  the  various  groups  of  mankind  is  postulated.  Equality is  a  con-
cept  that  really  does not make  any  sense  unless  it is  linked  to  some-
thing  else.  Equality  as  spoken  of  in  the  Declaration  is  a  political
attribute.  All  mankind,  so  the  document  says,  is  on  a  par  with  re-
spect  to certain  attributes  relevant  to capacity  for  governing.  Fourth,
stemming  from  that  proposition,  inherent  injustice  of rulership  from
afar over  any people  is  asserted.  This last proposition  is articulated  in
terms  of  the  law  of  nature  and  nature's  God  in  the  intellectual  style
of the  times.  The  makers  of  the Declaration  might  have  stated  their
objections to rule from London  on pragmatic  grounds that  this system
was  no  longer  practical  because  the  British  Crown  had  ceased  to
understand  American  problems  and  the  Americans  were  getting  too
big to be  held in leading  strings.
THE  IDEA  OF  COLLECTIVE  SECURITY
A  set  of  corollaries  seems  naturally  to  flow  from  the  far-reach-
ing  propositions  I  have  cited.  These  corollaries  were  strong  in  the
minds  of  many  American  leaders  at  the  time  of  the  Declaration.
They  have continued  to  appeal  to American  thought  from one  stage
to  another.  Universal  independence  is  seen  as  a  key  to justice,  order,
and  peace  in  the  world.  This  attitude  rejects  turmoil  as  aberrant  in
affairs  among  organized  peoples.  Stability  is  seen  as  the  natural  or
normal  condition.  A  harmony  of  interest  among  peoples  is  assumed
as  natural.  There  is  a strong  frame  of logic  in  this  set  of ideas.  That
is  to say,  the  ideas may be  assailable  on  empirical  grounds,  but  their
structure  as  ideas  is  coherent.  If every  organized  people  will  simply
leave  every  other organized  people alone,  then no  trouble  or violence
or  threats  will  disturb  tranquility  among  the  various  peoples.  More-
over,  if  every  organized  people  so  respects  the  sanctity  of  the  prin-
ciple  of  universal  independence  as  to  be  willing  to  help  any  differ-
entiated  people  who  may  be  attacked  or  threatened  by  another
organized  people  which  may  turn  malefactor,  then  all  peoples  can
feel  secure.  The  phrase  for  this  idea  is  collective  security,  and  the
idea  is  integrally  linked  to  our  traditional  postulates  about  inde-
pendence.
This  idea  was  basic  to the  League  of  Nations,  for  which  Wood-
row  Wilson  strove  at  the  time  of  the  first  of  the  two  world  wars  in
which  this  country  has  participated.  They  were  revived  in  the
United  Nations  during  the  second  World  War.  These  are  not  stra-
tegic  ideas.  That  is  to  say,  they  do  not  involve  looking  at  the  world
in  a  way  that  differentiates  among  one's  potential  friends  and  one's
potential  enemies.  Under  the  idea  of  collective  security,  any  nation
is  presumed  to  look  upon  all  the  other  nations  as  probable  friends
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rant  as  to  make  a  threat.  The  merits  of  the  case  are  supposed  to
bring others  to your  side  in  the  event  of  danger,  and  the prospect  of
facing  overwhelming  odds  is  supposed  to  be  enough  to  deter  any
potential  offender  and  to persuade  all  organized  peoples  to  be  good.
In  that  kind  of  a  situation  no  nation  would  have  to  worry
about  alliances  or  balances  of  power  or  anything  of  that  sort.  In
1943  Secretary  Hull,  returning  from  the  Moscow  Conference  at
which  our  principal  allies  had  agreed  to  go  along  in  the  revival  of
a  world  organization,  told  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  in
joint session  that  there  would  be  no  concern  over  strategic  questions
in  the  postwar  world.  Such matters  as  alliances,  concern  for  the bal-
ance  of  power,  and  spheres  of  influence  would  all  be  rendered  ob-
solete  and  consigned  to  the  unhappy  past.  President  Roosevelt,  ad-
dressing  the  same  body  after  his  return  from  Yalta  a  year  and  a
few  months  later,  made  the same  statement  in  words  almost  identical
with  Hull's.
These  anticipations  were  bolstered  by  assumptions  concerning
what  had  happened  to  the  Russians  and  how  they  would  behave
thenceforward.  Their  ideology  was  supposed  to  have  burned  out
under the  fires  of war.  They  were  supposed  to  have become  so  fear-
ful  of  any  renewal  of  hostilities  that  they  would  feel  constrained  to
abandon  any  attitude  likely  to contribute  to  animosities  among  na-
tions.  They  were  supposed  to  have  become  used  to  the  methods
of  cooperation  through  the  experience  of  combined  action  against
the  common  enemies.  Supposedly,  moreover,  dealing  with  the  prob-
lems  posed  by  the  ex-enemy  countries  would  itself  provide  the
cement of  cooperation  in the postwar  situation.  As  a way  of helping
the  process  along,  the  United  States  and  its  closer  allies  would  do
everything  proper  and  expedient  to  reassure  the  Soviet  Union,  to
allay  whatever  suspicions  might  still  be  latent  in  it,  and  to  set  a
good  example.  By  these  means,  the  Soviet  Union  would  be  encour-
aged  into  adaptability.  I  suppose  we  can  appropriately  sum  up  all
these  ideas  as  the  I-understand-Old-Joe  fallacy.
In reality,  the  Russians  proved recalcitrant,  ambitious,  and  suspi-
cious,  and  their  forces  pressed  into  Eastern  and  Central  Europe.
The  other  European  peoples  beyond  the  Russian  sway  felt  pressed
and  threatened.  The  problem  of  the  ex-enemy  states,  far  from  pro-
viding  the  occasion  and  incentive  for  further  cooperation  among
the  principal  wartime  allies,  produced  the  very  issues  on  which  co-
operation  foundered.  A  factor  of  signal  importance  was  the  debility
of the United  Kingdom.  It  was  exhausted  by  war.  The  extent  of  its
37depletion  was  revealed  suddenly  as  a  big  surprise.  In  dealing  with
international  affairs,  our  minds  continuously  seek  analytically  to
single  out  the  determinative  events-to  find  those  factors  by  which
to  account  for  others.  In  this  manner  of  thinking,  I  should  say  that
perhaps  the  single  most  important  development  in  the  period  of
World  War  II  and  its  immediate  sequel  was  the  draining  away  of
British  power.  So  many  of  the  other  awesome  circumstances  were
contingent  upon  that one  development.
U.  S.  POLICY  IN  EUROPE
The  United  States perforce  had  to  change  its  line of  action.  This
change  did  not  involve,  however,  renouncing  the  UN  as  an  embodi-
ment  of  hope.  The  hope  of  developing  the  UN  into  an  agency  for
collective  security  was  postponed  but  not  abandoned.  The  organiza-
tion itself  was to remain  in being  as  a  ready  framework  of  collabora-
tion  if and  when  the  Soviet  Union  could  be  brought  to  see  the  error
of its recalcitrant  ways  and  persuaded,  enticed,  or  compelled  by  lack
of  an  alternative  to  redeem  the  hope.  Meanwhile,  in  the period  from
1947  to  1949,  the  United  States  launched  a  set  of  undertakings
designed  to  bolster  the  nations  under  threat  in  Europe.  These  un-
dertakings  inherently  involved  distinctions  between  peoples  or  states
amicably  disposed  and  those  hostilely  disposed.  They  were  in  that
basic  sense  strategic  in  a  way  that  collective  security  undertakings
are  not.  I  refer  here  to  the  Truman  Doctrine,  to the  Marshall  Plan
for European  Recovery,  and  to the  commitment  of  the  United  States
instrumentalities  and  resources  to  the  military  security  of  Europe  in
the North Atlantic Alliance.
These  undertakings  have  worked  as  well  as  anything  ever
does  in  the  obdurate  field  of foreign  policy.  Europe's  public  life  has
been  restored.  The  national  economies  of  the  area  have  been  put
back  on  their  feet  and  are  prospering  in  the  main.  General  self-con-
fidence  has  replaced  the  anxieties  that were  rife less than  two  decades
ago.  The  situation  is  not  perfect or  even  completely  satisfactory,  but
it  is  immeasurably  improved  over  what  it  was.  I  should  say  these
undertakings  have  worked  except  in  so  far  as  the  United  States  has
overreached  in  trying  to  press  the  European  nations  into  acceptance
of  American  preconceptions  of  how  those  nations  should  merge  into
new  frameworks  of collaboration.  Here  some  of our  overzealous  ad-
vocacy  has  run  into  obdurate  factors  of  identity  and  history,  and
the  European  nations  have  proved  to  be  less  plastic  than  some  of
our planners would  prefer.  Our undertakings  in  Europe have  worked
so  well  that  the  United  States  has  lost  a  good  deal  of  the  leverage
that  it  had  on  the  European  situation  only  a  few  years  ago.  That
38fact  helps  explain  why  some  of the  later designs  have met  obstacles.
In  a sense,  some  of  our  present  frustrations  are  the  consequences  of
some  of our  earlier  successes.
Here  I  would  stress  the  consonance  between  our  undertakings
in  Europe,  especially  the  successful  ones,  and  the  traditional  as-
sumptions  and  values  to  which  I  referred  at  the  outset.  President
Truman's  speech  in  1947  enunciating  the  Truman  Doctrine  made
clear  the  integral  relation  of  the  value  of  independence  to  what  we
were  trying  to achieve.  We were  to help others against  threats to their
independence,  whether  external  or  internal.  In  no  sense  was  the
United  States attempting  to take over  those positions  or the  direction
of  affairs  in  those  positions.  Our  policies  rested  on  the  assumption
of  the  existence  of  peoples  and  regimes  endowed  with  a  sense  of
identity,  faculties  of  will,  sense  of  purpose,  and  a  grasp  of  history
which enabled them  to preserve  what they wished  to be  on  the  basis
of what  they  had been  in  the past.
COMMUNIST  APPROACH  TO  EMERGING  NATIONS
We  should  ponder  for  a  moment  the  effect  of  these  undertak-
ings  and  their  success  on the  Communist  regime  in  the  Soviet Union
and  on  the  Communist  forces  aligned  with  it.  Their  reliance  was  on
a  view  of  history  by  which  their  interests,  their  outlooks,  and  their
purposes  were  bound  to  prevail.  What  they  preferred  and  sought
was  a  reflection  of  the  dictates of  history's  laws.  Anything  helpful  to
that outlook  was postulated  as legitimate.  Anything counter  to it  was
ipso facto  illegitimate  and  contrary  to  the  thrust  of  history.  More-
over,  the  Communists  assumed  themselves  the  advocates  of  every-
body  else's  future.  The  Communist interests  were  supposed  to be  ul-
timately  everybody's  interests.  The  regime  which  had  come  into
power  in Russia in  1917 had  looked upon itself  as  the forerunner  and
the exemplar  for  all  of Europe.  All  the war-weary  peoples  were  sup-
posed  to  fall  in  the  Russian  footsteps.  That  dream  was  unfulfilled.
In  the  immediate  sequel  to  World  War  II  Soviet  Russia  was  in  a
hugely  expanded  position,  with  vastly  greater  power  than  ever  be-
fore,  and  with  great  prospects  of  being  able  to  accomplish  what  had
eluded  the  Communists  a generation  before.  When  the United  States
interposed  to  shore  up  the  European  countries  lying  to  the  west,
those  in  charge  of Soviet  affairs felt  cheated.  The Communists  faced
a danger  of the collapse  and refutation  of their doctrine.
In  that  situation  the  Communists  turned  for  alternative  op-
portunities  to  what,  for  want  of  a  better  term,  we  call  the  Third
World.  The  term  is  oversimple  and  much  too  pat  in  implying  only
three  groups  of  nations-the  Western  allies,  the  Communists,  and
39then  all the  others.  Actually,  those  others are  a  variegated  lot.  They
include  an array  of juridically  independent  states  which  do  not  seem
to have established  their  characters.  They  are  sovereign  in  the  sense
of  being  juridically  autonomous.  In  varying  degrees  they  fall  short
of  being  sovereign  in  a  sense  of  having  regimes  fully  capable  of
managing  their  internal  affairs.  They  are  not  all  new  states.  Some
of  them  owe  their  independence  to  the  events  of  the  Napoleonic
period.  Others  came  along  into  independence  in  the  sequel  to World
War  I.  A  very  large  number  have  been  precipitated  into  independ-
ence  by  events  during  and  since  World  War  II.  These  are  all  states
cast  up  by  the  ebb  of  empire.  How  far  the  process  will  go  is  any-
body's  guess.  The concept  of  statehood  is  being  carried  to  an  absurd
and  dogmatic  extreme  in  our  time.  Maritius  and  the  Maldives  and
Gambia  are  the  latest  ones  in  line.  Soon  it  will  be  Basutoland.
Eventually  why  not  Pitcairn  Island?  It  can  send  every  one  of  its
residents  abroad  as  an  ambassador  somewhere,  and  presumably  it
could  find  adequate  subvention.
Most  of  these  states  are  in  Africa  and  Asia.  They  are  widely
variant  in  characteristics  such as  size,  resources,  ethnic  classification,
and  so  on.  They  do  present  certain  common  traits  with  respect  to
lack  of  developed  public  life,  identity,  sense  of  history,  and  rapport
between  regimes  and  peoples.  Often  their  spokesmen  articulate  am-
bitions  hugely  in  excess  of means.  Lacking  alternatives,  their  leaders
resort  to  emotion  to  marshal  unity.  They  are  usually  necessitous  in
economic  matters.  They  are  ambivalent,  if  not  hostile,  toward  the
more  successful  and  affluent  states  to  which  they  were  once  in  tute-
lage.  In  compensation  for  domestic  inadequacies,  many  of  these
new  states  take  inordinate  interest  in  outside  affairs.  If  they  cannot
amount to much  at home,  they  can  at  least amount  to  something  on
the world  stage by  strenuous  advocacy  at  the  United  Nations  and  in
their regional groupings.
The  Communists  were  slow  to  realize  their  opportunity  with
respect  to  these  nations.  Actually,  the  great  movement  into  inde-
pendence  in  the  sequel  to  World  War  II  took  the  Communists  by
surprise.  Their  theory  had  not  led  them  to  expect  that empire  would
give  up  so  readily  and  so  voluntarily.  Over  a  span  of  a  few  years,
however,  the  Communists  have  rounded  out  and  articulated  their
approach  to  the  Third  World.  It  is  a  formula  for  enlarging  and  ex-
ploiting  opportunities.  It  takes  into  account  the  prodigious  character
of  contemporary  weapons  and  the  general  reluctance  to  use  them.
The  formula  also  reflects  the  lessons  gleaned  from  developments  in
the Far East  since World  War II.
40The  formula  is  called  "the  doctrine  of  national  liberation  wars."
It  is  the  other  side  of what  the Moscow  regime  calls  the  doctrine  of
peaceful  coexistence.  Direct  confrontation  with  the  Western  world,
especially  the  United  States,  is  to  be  avoided  because  it  is  all  too
likely  to  involve  the  danger  of  a  cataclysmic  general  war.  Within
the  limits  imposed  by  that  condition,  the  Communist  powers  will
do  whatever  is  feasible  to  create  and  to  exploit  cleavages  between
the  emerging  states  and  the  metropolitan  countries  of  the  West.
These  latter  countries  are,  of  course,  called  imperialist  in  the  Com-
munist  lexicon,  irrespective  of  whether  they  still  play  or  have  ever
played  the game  of empire.  Every  purpose  and every interest  of these
powers  is  labeled  imperialistic,  and  the  Communists  will  do  their
utmost  to  get  the  regimes  and  the  peoples  of  the  emerging  states
so  to regard  them.  The  Communists  will  count  on  the ultimate  fail-
ure of every  alternative  to their  own  system  in  these  neophyte  states.
They  assert  the  sole  legitimacy  of their  own  pattern  of purposes  and
thereby  construe  all  competing  or  differential  purposes  as  illegiti-
mate.  Both of the polar  capitals  of communism,  namely  Moscow  and
Peking,  endorse  this  general  approach.  They  disagree  widely  and
deeply on the  tactics  and  on the  order  of interests  and  opportunities,
but they  do not disagree  on the basic  propositions.
U.  S.  POLICY  IN  ASIA
You  will  note  that  I  have  mentioned  China  for  the  first  time
as  one  of  the  great  Communist  powers.  The  Communist  accession
in  China was one  of the great postwar  developments  in  the  Far East.
As  China emerged  from  World War  II,  it looked  like  a primary
candidate  for  what  we  now  call  the  Third  World.  It  was  indeed
not  a  new  country  without  a  history.  The  Chinese  were  an  ancient
people.  China,  however,  had  undergone  many  difficulties  in  recent
centuries  and  was  long  in  eclipse.  In  its  weakness  it  was  subjected
to  many  inequalities  in  its  relationships  to  outside  powers.  Now,
after World  War II,  China was  at  last to be freed  of these  trammels.
It  was  going to  join  the  great  powers.  That  purpose  was  one  enter-
tained  and  fostered  by  the  United  States.  Whenever  anyone  con-
fronts  me  with  the  statement  that  the  United  States  failed  in  the
realization  of  its  war  aims  in  World  War  II,  I  counter  by  pointing
out that  the goal  of having  China take  its place  as a  great power  has
been largely  achieved.
China had  been  done  in  by  the  war.  The  country  was  depleted.
Its  people  and  its  regime  were  demoralized.  In  many  ways  it  was
not  too bad  a  regime.  At  least it  had  a willful  leader  of  steady pur-
pose.  The  regime  lacked  means,  however.  It  certainly  lacked  com-
41mand  of  the  situation  confronting  it.  In  China's  situation,  our  at-
tempts to help did not help. In that respect the situation was markedly
different  from  that  of  the European  countries  which  we  assisted.
There  were  possible  alternatives  to  what  we  did,  but  keep  in
mind  that  possibility  differs  from  feasibility.  Possibly  a  decision  to
interpose  our forces  in China in 1944,  concentrating  our resources  in
that  area,  rather  than fighting  island  by  island  northward  in the  off-
shore  campaign,  would  have  prevented  the  ultimate  debacle.  Clearly
this  government  never  addressed  itself  properly  to  that  possibility.
We  do  not  know  whether  it  would  have  worked.  By  1946-48  the
situation  in  China  had  deteriorated  drastically.  The  Communists
were  pushing  the process  of deterioration  for  all it  was  worth  in ex-
pectation  of taking  over  as the  receivers.
Suppose  the  United  States  had  even  then  decided  to  spend
resources  in  men  and  material  to  the  extent  it  has  done  so  in  ap-
purtenant  areas  in  the sequel  to China's  debacle.  We  can  only  specu-
late  on the answer.  The White Paper  on China issued by  our govern-
ment  in  1949  made  clear  the basis  of  our  decision  not to  take  such
drastic  measures.  The  United  States  was  preoccupied  with  efforts
to salvage  the situation  in Europe.  There  were prudent  considerations
against  assuming  so  great  an  additional  burden.  Besides  all  that,
an  effective  interposition  would  have  required  the  deployment  of
great  numbers  of  American  forces  on  the  ground  in  China.  Such
an  action  would  have  entailed  the  irreducible  question  of  who  was
in  charge.  If  the  United  States  had  assumed  control  of  the  factors
bearing on China's  security,  it would have been taking over  a colony,
whatever  we  called  it.  It  might  have  been  necessary  to  stay  on  for
generations.  If  the  United  States  had  interposed  large  forces  in
China,  while  leaving  the Chinese  regime in charge  of China's  affairs,
the United States would have been putting  itself in  a subordinate  role,
that  of  a  tributary.  The  United  States,  for  reasons  considered  ade-
quate  at  the  time,  signed  off  in  China.  It  renounced  any  military
commitment  on  the  Asian  mainland.  The  White  Paper  expressed
hope  in  an  ultimate  assertion  of  the  "democratic  individualism"  of
the  Chinese  people.  It  is  ironical  to find  our  government  postulating
hopes  in abstractions,  so my Sinologist  friends  tell  me,  which  are  not
translatable  into the  Chinese  tongues.
The  Communist  accession  in  China  tripled  the  numbers  of  peo-
ples  subject  to  communism  and  added  by  a  third  to  the  territory.
That  was  an  enormous  shift  counterbalancing  the  measures  which
we were taking for the  salvation of Europe.
42Along  with  a  signing  off  with  respect  to  mainland  China,  the
United  States  ended  its  military  involvement  in  the  Korean  penin-
sula.  The  joint  occupation  of Korea,  with  Soviet  forces  at  the  upper
end  and  United  States  forces  at  the  lower  end  of  the  peninsula,
divided  at  the  38th  parallel  by  a  line making  no  logical or practical
sense  in  relation  to the  terrain,  was  entered into  when that dream  of
postwar  cooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union was  still intact.  By  1949,
the  continued  occupation  of  South  Korea  by  our  forces  seemed  to
be  a  misallocation  of  resources.  The  United  States  withdrew  its
forces.  It  succeeded  in  getting  a local  regime  set up  under UN  aegis.
The  United States  did  not enter  into  a  treaty  of  assurance  to  South
Korea. It gave no unilateral  guarantee.  Either of  these courses  would
have  inherently  required  a  delimitation  of  the obligation.  Inevitably,
some  juridic  legitimacy  would  have  been  conveyed  to  the  division
at the  38th parallel.  This would  have run counter  to the proposition,
essential  to our  case  and  essential  to  the  South Korean  regime,  that
it was  the only one properly established in that country.
Conceivably,  the  United  States might  have  left a  relatively  small
unit  to  keep  the  U.  S.  flag  flying  as  a  "keep  out"  warning  to  the
forces  lying  to  the  north  where  a  formidable  Communist  military
establishment  had  been  left  in  charge  by  the  Soviet  Union  with  a
Soviet  military  mission  still  on  hand  in  a  role  of  superintendency.
To have  left  such a force  with a flag  would  have entailed  one  or  the
other  of  two  kinds  of  arrangements.  On  the  one  hand,  the  U.  S.
might  have  retained  charge  of  South  Korean  security.  In  that  case
we  would  have  in  effect  had  a  colony,  or  a  dependency.  On  the
other  hand,  the  United  States  might  have  left  a  force  deployed  in
the  area  with  the  South  Korean  government  in  charge  of  security
policy.  In that  case  we  would  have given  hostages to  a small  regime
with  purposes not necessarily  consonant  with our own.  As  the central
circumstance,  the United States wished  to be free  of military involve-
ment in continental East Asia.
The  attack  launched  across  the  38th  parallel  with  shattering
effect  determined  otherwise.  This  government  saw  in  a  moment
the  necessity  of  moving  to  the  defense  of  the  position.  Our  forces
had  been  there.  The  regime  enjoyed  our  patronage.  To  have  left
it to go under unassisted  would  have  destroyed  the  credibility  of  our
commitments  elsewhere.  Eventually  the  struggle  over  Korea  was
fought  to  a  stand-still.  After  many  jerks  and  bobbles  we  played  it
for  a  tie.  The  armistice  terms  only  brought  an  end  to  the  heavy
firing  on  a front  that  had already  been  stabilized  in  military  reality.
Our  forces  remained  pinned  down  there  in  a  continental  position
where this government  did not really wish  them to be.  They are  there
43in great  strength.  The  old  irreducible  question  applies.  We  have  in
most  respects,  though not  in  name,  an  imperial  responsibility.  Fortu-
nately, the UN good housekeeping  seal is on the relationship  and helps
obscure  some  of  the  realities.  The  armistice  terms  left  the  Chinese
adversary  free  to  redeploy  arms  and  munitions  to Indo-China.
An  effect  of  that  war  was  a  sense  of  frustration  and  embitter-
ment  in American  strategic and  political thinking.  "No more  Koreas"
was  the  watchword  at  the  Pentagon.  The  gist  of  this  was  that  we
should  avoid  any  further  commitments  to  ground  warfare  on  the
Asian  continent.  This  thinking  created  a  paradoxical  difficulty.  The
United  States  concurrently  wished  to  deter  any  further  Communist
advances  in  East  Asia,  as  elsewhere.  How  could  it  do  this  while
making  well  known  its  distaste  for  further  involvements?  As  you
must  appreciate,  in  the  hard  business  of  strategy,  a  well  advertised
wish  to avoid  a  military  encounter  is  very  often  an  almost  sure  way
of  encouraging  it.
In  Indo-China  the  French  were  fighting  a  feckless  war  against
indigenous  forces.  It  is  often  carelessly  called in  retrospect  a  colonial
war.  The  phrase  is  not  accurate.  French  dominion  was  no  longer
at  issue.  The  question,  rather,  was  who  should  establish  the  condi-
tions  to  be  operative  following  French  withdrawal.  The  French
were  trying  to  establish  the  conditions.  Communist  forces  were
trying  to  call  the  turn.  With  the  step-up  of  Communist  operations
following  the  Korean  armistice,  the  French  cause  was  rendered
hopeless.  We  tried  to  save  the  situation  with  the  feckless  threat  of
nuclear  retaliation.  After  debating  with  ourselves  about  trying  to  go
to  the rescue  of  the French  with  air bombardment  and  possibly  even
ground  troops,  our  government  decided  negatively.
The  terms  following  the  French  defeat  called  for  neutralization
of  Indo-China,  the  component  countries  of  which  were  established
in  at  least  nominal  independence.  Strict  limits  were  to  be  imposed
on  military  assistance  to  any  of  these  component  countries.  They
were  not to  become military bases for any outside  powers.  One of the
three  countries,  Viet  Nam,  was  divided  at  the  17th  parallel,  with
a  Communist  regime  in  the  north  and  a  non-Communist  regime
in  the  south.  After  a relatively  brief  period,  a  year  or  two,  elections
were  to  be  held  to  settle  the  question  of  which  regime  should  pre-
vail  over  the  whole  land.  The  notion  of  settling  such  a  question  of
legitimacy  and  dominion  by  election  in  a  land  which  had  no  elec-
toral  tradition  and which  was  divided  into  two  mutually  hostile juris-
dictions  seems,  now  in retrospect,  as  it did  to men  of practical  judg-
ment  at  the  time,  to  have  pushed  fantastical  statesmanship  to  a  new
outer limit.
44Secretary  of  State  Dulles  was  determined  to  avoid  a  new  Com-
munist  encroachment.  He  felt  certain  that the  omission  of  any  kind
of  a pledge  or  warning  as  in the  case  of  Korea  had  invited  the  at-
tack  and  brought  on  the  war  there.  His  method  was  to  secure  the
area  against further Communist  encroachments  by prefiguring  United
States  involvement  in that  event.  Such was  the purpose  of the  South
East  Asia  security  treaty  and  the  organization  which  it  projected.
Such,  explicitly,  was  the  intent  of  the  protocols  adopted  and  an-
nounced  concurrently  with  the  Manila Treaty.  One  of them  avowed
that  the  non-Communist  parts  of  former  Indo-China  were  of  con-
cern to the security interests  of the treaty participants,  which included
Thailand,  Pakistan,  the  Philippines,  Australia,  New Zealand,  France,
and  the United  Kingdom  as  well  as  the United  States.  Our  strength
was  the  real  factor.  The  other  of  the  Manila  protocols  was  the
declaration  in  the  long  American  tradition  of  foreswearing  domina-
tion  of  other  peoples-a  pledge  to  support  their  independence  and
practical  autonomy.
You  know  the  rest  of the  story.  These  declarations  were  accom-
panied by expressions  of our distaste for the very  sort of involvement
that  would  be  entailed  if  we  should  ever be  called  upon  to  redeem
our  undertaking.  Even  great  powers  cannot  ordain  the  conditions  in
which  their wills may be  tested. Events  beyond a  nation's jurisdiction
repeatedly  bring  up the  issue  of put  up  or shut  up.  That  is  the way
it  has been  in  Viet Nam.  It  is  a  miserable  situation  in which  to  be
involved.  The  President  knows  that.  Our  commanders  know  that.
I  have never  yet  met anyone in the line  of  policy who  did  not know
it.  I  know  it.  You  know  it.  I  cannot  imagine  what  gets  into  the
minds  of  professors  and  others  who  tell  us  as  much  in  a  tone  of
making  a  significant  revelation.  As  you  must  appreciate,  there  may
well  be  henceforth  no  situation  favorable  to  our  interests  and  pur-
poses  in  the contest  which  pervades  world  affairs.  According  to the
adversaries'  relevant  doctrine,  the  challenges  will  henceforth  be  in
areas where  we shall have great diffculty  bearing  the brunt in  making
our  preferences  effective.
In  the  Vietnamese  situation,  obviously  our  government  faces  a
problem  of how  to conduct  the battle  effectively,  or  as effectively  as
it  falls  to  us  to  conduct  it,  without  taking  charge  of  the  situation.
Whatever  the  facade  may  be,  the  deployment  required  is  bound  to
be  of  such  magnitude  as  to  involve  that old  irreducible  question  to
which  I  have  referred  already.  Last  winter,  as  you  will  recall,  our
forces  got  a  sudden  bitter  lesson  concerning  the  follies  of  making
great  deployments  of  expensive  and  intricate  instruments  of  war
without  taking  charge  of  perimeter  security.  Perimeters  in  warfare
45can  be  mighty  thick.  We  see  evidences  in  the  press  of  increasing
United  States  control  of transport and  of  such  aspects  as  censorship.
Obviously,  a  great  power  cannot  fight  a  war  of  such  magnitude  in
such  an area  without  taking  charge  in  essential  ways.
The  Vietnamese  war  entails  other  great  difficulties.  One  set  of
these  difficulties  pertains  to  the  circumstances  of  quasi  war-war
fought on the margins  of our consciousness  and  imposing  great  hard-
ships on  a few  while  the  rest of  us  go  our  way  unaffected  and  often
unaware.  This  aspect  bears  on  some  in  all  branches  of  our  armed
services.  We  hear  now  that  the  military  effort  has  rounded  the
corner.  Alas,  so  many  roundings  of  the  corner  have  been  reported
by our  spokesmen  that we have  now  made  the circle  at least  two and
maybe  three  times.  This  time,  however,  I  have  a  feeling  that  there
may  be  some  truth  in  the  report.  Up  to  now,  I  have  made  it  a
practice  to  switch off my  TV or  skip  over  the  newspaper  item  when-
ever our defense  magistrates  have  given  us  their sunny  and obviously
unsubstantiated  reassurances.  I  do  not  think  they  can  go  on  being
wrong  forever,  and  I  do  think  they  are  now  beginning  to  come
somewhat  near  to  being  right.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  sign
yet  of  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  the  Communist  forces  to  become
amenable  parties  in  negotiations.
I  have  no  doubt,  moreover,  that  even  with  the  best  of  fortune
there  are  many  ordeals  and  ambiguities  ahead.  Our  government's
hope  clearly  is  to confront  the  Communist  forces  in North  Viet Nam
and  those  in  Peking  and  Moscow  who  support  them  with  such
paramount  power  that  they  will  perforce  sign  a  reliable  agreement
under  which  they  will give up on  their doctrine  of national  liberation
wars  in  that  theater  where  it  is  at  its  most  critical  test.  There  is
always  the  latent  danger-I  cannot  imagine  why  our  adversaries
have  not  tried  this  line-that  the  Communists  will  agree  to  the
proper  terms,  make  all  the  promises  called  for,  bring  about  a  re-
traction  of  U.  S. forces,  and,  in  face  of whatever  guarantee  we  have
given, attempt to take the situation  over piecemeal  by stealth anyway.
In  that  situation,  once  out,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  for  this
nation  to  muster  its  will  to  resume  the  struggle.  This  portentous
danger  is  inherent  in  our  proposition  of  unconditional  negotiations.
I  shall  attempt  no  predictions.
CONCLUSION
The  world  of  policy  is  adventitious  and  full  of  imponderables.
It is not  possible  to  see  very far  ahead,  nor is  it  always  true  that  the
alternative  to  a  bad  situation  is  necessarily  a  good  one.  The  world
in  which  everything  would  have  come  out  just  dandy  if  only  this
46little error  had  been  avoided  or  only  this  course or that  eschewed  is
an  academician's  world.  It  is  not  the  world  in  which  men  with  re-
sponsibilities  engage  with  real  decisions.  Policy  and  security  are
obdurate  and  baffling  business.  The  only  men  who  are  masters  of
the  answers  are  the  ones  who  write  books.
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